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 1 
TRADE FINANCE IN EAST ASIA: 
POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THE SHORTFALL 
Trade Finance in East Asia — Potential Responses to the Shortfall 
ROSS P BUCKLEY,* DOUGLAS W ARNER† AND REBECCA L STANLEY‡ 
The crisis of 2008 saw many European banks reduce their provision of trade finance in East 
Asia. Notwithstanding the actions of the Group of Twenty and other bodies to redress this, a 
substantial shortfall in trade finance facilities in the region remains. This article explores the 
development of this shortfall and analyses potential responses to it. These responses range from 
some much needed further revisions to the Basel III rules, to the deepening of cross-border 
cooperation, creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance, encouraging co-financing 
among the various providers of trade finance both private and public and establishing a regional 
trade finance database. In addition, the article ponders the likelihood of China’s banks 
beginning to take a substantial role in providing trade finance to the region. Trade finance offers 
China’s banks a low risk means of expanding into international business and offers China a way 
to provide the sort of important service to its region that regional leaders typically seek to 
provide. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Trade finance is essential to support global trade, and the region that finances 
more trade transactions than any other is East Asia.1 Historically, trade has been 
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important in the evolution and development of civilisations.2 Today, 
international trade enhances efficiency and competitiveness within economies 
and promotes economic development. 
Some 80–90 per cent of trade transactions are supported by some form of 
credit financing, making trade finance an integral part of the world economy.3 
Finance for international trade transactions is important for wealthy nations and 
often critical for developing and emerging markets, where both exporters and 
importers may be severely constrained by limited working capital. 
This paper starts by examining the impact of the global financial crisis on 
trade finance and how the world responded to the subsequent trade finance 
shortfall, with a particular focus on the East Asian region. While the response of 
the Group of Twenty (‘G20’) proved effective in increasing the availability of 
trade finance, a substantial trade finance gap has remained in East Asia. The next 
part of the paper examines the two greatest challenges facing trade finance in 
Asia today: the withdrawal of credit from European banks and the 
implementation of the Basel III Regulations.4 
The second half of the paper moves on to analyse the potential responses to 
these challenges, including making further changes to the Basel III requirements, 
deepening cross-border cooperation, encouraging co-finance between public and 
private institutions and creating a ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance. It 
also suggests the establishment of a regional trade finance database.  
Finally, we explore why China has not yet stepped in to address the trade 
finance gap within the region. Trade finance offers China’s banks a low risk 
means of expanding into international business and it is likely that China will 
play a role in addressing the trade finance gap in the next few years. 
II TRADE FINANCE AFTER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The global financial crisis that commenced in 2007–08 sparked a substantial 
worldwide shortfall in trade finance in a global market which was then estimated 
                                                 
 2 See K N Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from 
the Rise of Islam to 1750 (Cambridge University Press, 1985) 15–20; Pascal Lamy, ‘Role of 
Cities in Trade’ (Speech delivered at the World Trade Organization Honour Day at the 
Shanghai World Expo 2010, Shanghai, 22 July 2010) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl163_e.htm>.  
 3 Marc Auboin, ‘Restoring Trade Finance during a Period of Financial Crisis: Stock-Taking 
of Recent Initiatives’ (Staff Working Paper No ERSD-2009-16, Economic Research and 
Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, December 2009) 1. 
 4 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision developed the Basel III Regulations after the 
latest global financial crisis. The reforms aim to improve regulation, supervision and risk 
management within the banking sector. Basel III’s key features include increased capital and 
liquidity requirements, leverage ratios and liquidity ratio coverage requirements: Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More 
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’ (Bank for International Settlements, December 2010, 
revised June 2011). 
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at USD10–12 trillion a year.5 The effects of this contraction were markedly 
different in different regions.6 South Asia, Korea and China were particularly 
affected, with China experiencing a double-digit decline in the availability of 
trade finance during 2008.7 The G20 responded with its ‘trade finance package’ 
in April 2009.8 In the words of the communiqué: 
we will take, at the same time, whatever steps we can to promote and facilitate 
trade and investment; and we will ensure availability of at least [USD]250 billion 
over the next two years to support trade finance through our export credit and 
investment agencies and through the [multilateral development banks]. We also 
ask our regulators to make use of available flexibility in capital requirements for 
trade finance.9 
The package provided a much-needed boost and financial agencies worldwide 
responded by making substantially more finance available for trade. 
Export credit agencies (‘ECAs’) increased credit insurance and risk mitigation 
capacity by creating programs for short-term lending of working capital and 
credit guarantees aimed primarily at small and medium enterprises (‘SMEs’).10 
Within the Asian region, the leaders of 11 Asian ECAs formed the Asian 
Regional Cooperation Group (‘RCG’) of the Berne Union, to meet annually to 
discuss responses to the global financial crisis.11 The group responded to the 
crisis with new initiatives to help sustain the trade and investment flow in the 
region and worldwide.12 In 2008, members of the RCG supported more than 
USD268 billion worth of international trade and investment.13 Since this time, 
the RCG has met three times a year to exchange information and views and 
consider solutions for the unique challenges faced by ECAs in East Asia.14 Such 
challenges include the rise of trade protectionism in some countries, stricter 
foreign exchange restrictions, frequent cases of false trade documents, 
substantial fluctuations in the economy and local conflicts.15 
                                                 
 5 The Centre for Economic Policy Research estimates the global market for trade finance, 
including both trade credit and insurance, to be roughly 80 per cent of 2008 trade flows, 
which were valued at USD15 trillion: Marc Auboin, ‘Boosting the Availability of Trade 
Finance in the Current Crisis: Background Analysis for a Substantial G20 Package’ (Policy 
Insight No 35, Centre for Economic Policy Research, June 2009) 1. See also Marc Auboin 
and Martina Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis: What Have We Learned in 
Recent Years?’ (Staff Working Paper No ERSD-2013-01, Economic and Research Statistics 
Division, World Trade Organization, January 2013) 14–15. 
 6 See Elizabeth Ho, ‘Developments in Banking and Financial Law: 2008–2009 — The Credit 
Crisis of 2008: XI The International Effects of the Credit Crisis’ (2008) 28 Review of 
Banking and Financial Law 102. 
 7 Wei Liu and Yann Duval, ‘Trade Finance in Times of Crisis and Beyond’ (Alerts on 
Emerging Policy Changes Issue No 3, Asia Pacific Research and Training Network on 
Trade, April 2009) 1–2. 
 8 Group of 20, ‘London Summit: Leaders’ Statement’ (Statement, 2 April 2009). 
 9 Ibid [22]. 
 10 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 17. 
 11 Berne Union Secretariat, Asian ECAs Joint Statement (13 August 2009) Berne Union 
<http://www.berneunion.org/asian-ecas-joint-statement/>. 
 12 Ibid. 
 13 Ibid. 
 14 Berne Union, Berne Union 2013 (Exporta Publishing & Events, 2013) 33. 
 15 Ibid. 
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Regional development banks (‘RDBs’) and the International Finance 
Corporation (‘IFC’) responded by significantly increasing the capacity of trade 
facilitation programs.16 The Asian Development Bank (‘ADB’) increased the 
capacity of its program from USD400 million to USD1 billion.17 The IFC also 
established a liquidity pool allowing co-financing operations with banks in 
developing countries, contributing USD5 billion to jump-start the fund.18 This 
amount was matched by USD7.5 billion in commercial bank funding,19 which 
has helped to support nearly USD20 billion of trade transactions since its 
creation.20 
Central banks in nations with substantial foreign exchange reserves responded 
by making portions of those reserves available to finance trade.21 Within East 
Asia, Korea pledged USD10 billion of its foreign exchange reserve to supply 
foreign currency to local banks and importers through repurchase agreements.22 
Indonesia acted similarly.23 The central bank in Japan opened temporary 
‘discount windows’ for local traders wanting to discount foreign trade 
receivables and other bills.24 On a much smaller scale, Thailand injected 
USD140 million worth of THB into the Export-Import Bank of Thailand (‘Thai 
EXIM Bank’) to increase export insurance and allocated a further USD85 
million to the Small Business Credit Guarantee Corporation so it could increase 
credit guarantee funds and loans to SMEs.25 
The G20 package ended in 2011.26 Trade finance availability and market 
conditions had improved continuously over the two year period up to this time; 
prices had fallen and the volume of transactions had increased, though with some 
volatility around an upward trend.27 However, recovery has not been even across 
all countries and gaps in trade finance persist. According to the ADB, the global 
value of trade finance requests received in 2011 by surveyed banks was 
approximately USD4.6 trillion, of which approximately USD1.6 trillion was 
rejected.28 
                                                 
 16 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 17. 
 17 World Trade Organization, The Challenges of Trade Financing (2014) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coher_e/challenges_e.htm>; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, Trade Financing and Regional Financial 
Institutions from a South–South Perspective, 4th sess, Provisional Agenda Item 3, UN Doc 
TD/B/C.II/MEM.2/11 (15 August 2012) 4 [16] (‘Trade Financing’). 
 18 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 17. 
 19 Ibid. 
 20 International Finance Corporation, Global Trade Liquidity Program (2014) 
<http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Industry_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_S
ite/Industries/Financial+Markets/Trade+and+Supply+Chain/GTLP/>. 
 21 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 17. 
 22 World Trade Organization, Challenges of Trade Financing, above n 17; Auboin, ‘Boosting 
the Availability of Trade Finance’, above n 5, 5–6. 
 23 World Trade Organization, Challenges of Trade Financing, above n 17; Auboin, ‘Boosting 
the Availability of Trade Finance’, above n 5, 6. 
 24 Marc Auboin, ‘Use of Currencies in International Trade: Any Changes in the Picture?’ 
(Staff Working Paper No ERSD-2012-10, Economic Research and Statistics Division, 
World Trade Organization, May 2012) 13. 
 25 Liu and Duval, above n 7, 3. 
 26 See generally Group of 20, above n 8. 
 27 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 20. 
 28 Committee on the Global Financial System, ‘Trade Finance: Developments and Issues’ 
(CGFS Paper No 50, Bank for International Settlements, January 2014) 51. 
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In 2010 the G20 Leaders in Seoul commissioned a report by the World Trade 
Organization on existing trade finance gaps and the effectiveness of programs 
aimed at addressing them.29 The report was presented at the G20 Summit in 
Cannes in November 2011 and recommended that the multilateral development 
banks and the World Bank Group expand the risk limits of their trade finance 
facilitation programs to allow for greater support to countries where local 
financial institutions cannot adequately support trade.30 The Asian region was 
identified as a priority area.31 
III EUROPE’S WITHDRAWAL OF TRADE FINANCE TO ASIA 
Efforts to address the Asian trade finance gap have been hampered by the 
ongoing economic crisis in Europe. European banks traditionally provided 
substantial trade finance facilities in East Asia and have severely limited their 
extensions of credit so as to improve their capital ratios.32 Since 2008, the 
proportion of international credit provided by Eurozone and Swiss banks to 
emerging Asia-Pacific economies has fallen from 38 per cent to 19 per cent of 
the region’s trade credit.33 Eurozone banks (excluding German banks) reduced 
their share of large-ticket Asian trade finance from 43 per cent to just 3 per cent 
in the 18 months leading up to the first quarter of 2012.34 French and Italian 
banks reportedly reduced their exposure to major Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations countries by 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively in this period.35 
The second half of 2011 saw a particularly rapid retreat, with European banks 
deleveraging their exposures to Asia by 18 per cent, a reduction of  
USD89 billion.36 This retreat has led to a dramatic increase in trade finance 
prices in Asian markets.37 According to Kah Chye Tan, ‘when European banks 
started to deleverage due to the Euro crisis [in 2011], trade finance pricing in 
Asian countries including India and China moved from 100 basis points to 200 
basis points in three weeks’.38 
The reduction in trade finance by European banks has left a funding gap at a 
time of increasing demand for finance in Asia. In 2011, a USD1 billion trade 
contract between the United States and China could not proceed due to the lack 
                                                 
 29 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 21. 
 30 Ibid 21–2. 
 31 Ibid. 
 32 Aki Ito and Shamim Adam, ‘European Retreat Squeezes Asia Trade Finance as ADB Sees 
Loan Demand Climb’, Bloomberg (online), 6 December 2011 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-05/credit-squeeze-hits-asia-trade-finance-as-
adb-loan-demand-soars.html>. 
 33 Adrian van Rixtel et al, ‘Highlights of the BIS International Statistics’ [2012] (December) 
BIS Quarterly Review 11, 17–18. 
 34 Huw Van Steenis et al, ‘Cross Asset Research: EU Bank Deleveraging and Asian Trade 
Finance’ (Report, Morgan Stanley Research, 1 May 2012) 1. 
 35 Takehiko Nakao, Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs, Japan, ‘International 
Regulatory Reform and New Financial Infrastructure in Asia’ (Speech delivered at the 
Asian Financial Forum, Hong Kong, 14 January 2013) 
<http://www.mof.go.jp/english/international_policy/others/20130114.htm>.  
 36 Van Steenis et al, above n 34, 4.  
 37 Michael Bainbridge, ‘Basel III Threat to Asian Trade Finance’, Financial News (online), 29 
October 2012 <http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2012-10-29/basel3-threat-to-asian-
trade-finance>. 
 38 Ibid. At the time, Tan was the Global Head of Trade and Working Capital at Barclays.  
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of trade finance.39 Recent data shows that Chinese exports grew by 25 per cent in 
the year to January 2013 and imports climbed by 28.8 per cent in the same 
period.40 In 2012, demand for trade finance products increased significantly.41 
Fortunately, Japanese banks and some international banks such as HSBC 
Holdings plc (‘HSBC’) and Standard Chartered plc (‘Standard Chartered’) have 
stepped in to cover much of the trade finance gap left by the European banks. 
Figure 1 shows that in the past two years Japanese banks have dramatically 
increased their share of large-ticket, regional trade finance volumes, growing 
from 6 per cent in 2010 to an extraordinary 54 per cent in the first quarter of 
2012.42 As a result, Japan became the largest provider of trade finance globally 
in 2012, with reported trade finance volumes of USD16.8 billion.43 The Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (‘ANZ’) has also capitalised on the 
European retreat, reporting a 29 per cent increase in trade finance revenue in 
2011 and a 58 per cent growth in Asia.44 
 
Figure 1: a comparison of the trade finance market share between 2010, 
the first half of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012. Source: Dealogic and 
Morgan Stanley Research. 
 
Most trade is financed in USD,45 and the retreat of the European banks has 
been in part due to the rising cost of borrowing USD since the start of the 
Eurozone crisis.46 Given their easy access to the USD, Japanese banks, ANZ, 
HSBC and Standard Chartered have thus been in a position to benefit from the 
European retreat.47 
Despite Japanese and other banks stepping in, there remains a shortfall of 
finance for trade in East Asia today. A survey conducted by the ADB in March 
2013 identified a trade finance gap of USD425 billion in developing Asia.48 This 
finding is serious given the critical role finance plays in facilitating trade. The 
shortfall particularly affects the Asia-Pacific region as a higher proportion of 
                                                 
 39 Trade Financing, UN Doc TD/B/C.II/MEM.2/11, 4 [15]. 
 40 Sarah Turner and V Phani Kumar, ‘China Data Helps Lift Most Asia Stocks; Japan Down’, 
MarketWatch (online), 8 February 2013 <http://articles.marketwatch.com/2013-02-
08/markets/36970890_1_quarterly-net-loss-sony-corp-china-data>. 
 41 See World Trade Organization, ‘Report on G-20 Trade Measures: Mid-May to Mid-October 
2012’ (Report, 31 October 2012) 15 [58]–[59]. 
 42 Van Steenis et al, above n 34, 17. 
 43 ‘Japan Tops Trade Finance Charts’, Global Trade Review (online), 25 January 2013 
<http://www.gtreview.com/trade-finance/global-trade-review-news/2013/January/Japan-
tops-trade-finance-charts_10637.shtml>. 
 44 Steve Slater, ‘Europe’s Banks Leave Room for Rivals to Fund World Trade’, Reuters 
(online), 16 April 2012 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/banks-trade-
idUSL5E8E1B1P20120416>; Ito and Adam, above n 32.  
 45 Trade finance is even more dollar denominated than global trade. For example, 80 per cent 
of letters of credit are in USD: Committee on the Global Financial System, above n 28, 13. 
 46 Francesco Guerrera, ‘French Banks Say Adieu to Financing Asian Trade’, The Wall Street 
Journal (online), 3 September 2012 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904 
43571904577629250952177234.html>. 
 47 See Van Steenis et al, above n 34, 18–26. 
 48 According to the 106 banks surveyed by the Asian Development Bank, almost USD2.1 
trillion worth of trade finance proposals were received in developing Asia, of which 
USD425 billion was not approved: Steven Beck et al, ‘Asian Development Bank Trade 
Finance Survey: Major Findings’ (Brief No 11, Asian Development Bank, March 2013) 3. 
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trade is financed there than in other regions.49 Notably, the majority of trade 
letters of credit issued globally are issued in Asia.50 
As well as a simple shortfall of finance, Asian companies have complained 
that the cost of trade finance is rising, possibly due to the growing pricing power 
of the few banks in the region willing to extend trade credit.51 While the top 40 
institutions represented 95 per cent of the Asian trade finance market in 2011, 
only 20 remained in the market for Asian trade finance in 2012.52 
IV BASEL III 
Apart from the retreat of European banks, the largest challenge on the horizon 
lies in the implementation of Basel III. While Basel III aims to establish a level 
playing field across borders, its implementation will not have the same impact 
worldwide. In the words of Takehiko Nakao, Vice Minister of Finance for 
International Affairs, Japan: 
[The] international standards of financial regulation [comprising Basel III] are 
based on the experiences of the financial crises in the US and Europe, and do not 
necessarily reflect the conditions of the financial sectors in Asian emerging 
countries.53 
As Basel III requires larger capital holdings against trade transactions,54 its 
implementation could slow trade financing in emerging and developing 
economies in the Asian region by substantially raising transaction costs and 
discouraging trade financing. This would thereby exacerbate the already 
precarious position of many nations in the region.55 According to recent findings 
by the ADB, 79 per cent of banks surveyed stated that the Basel regulatory 
requirements had played a significant role in limiting trade finance.56  
Seventy-five per cent of the banks surveyed indicated that they would reduce 
trade finance support by five per cent or more if Basel III were fully 
implemented.57 Furthermore, 65 per cent of respondents to the International 
Chamber of Commerce (‘ICC’) Global Trade and Finance Survey 2013 said that 
implementation of Basel III regulations is affecting the cost of funds and 
liquidity for trade finance to some, or a large, extent.58 
                                                 
 49 See Committee on the Global Financial System, above n 28, 9. 
 50 Bainbridge, above n 37. 
 51 Guerrera, above n 46. 
 52 Van Steenis et al, above n 34, 18. 
 53 Nakao, above n 35.  
 54 Esther Tan, Trade Finance Impeded by Basel III; Regulators Must Take a Step Back (18 
December 2013) The Asian Banker <http://www.theasianbanker.com/research-notes/tra 
de-finance-impeded-by-basel-iii-regulators-must-take-a-step-back>. 
 55 Shawn Baldwin, ‘Basel Barriers: How Capital Requirements Would Impede Progress in the 
Sovereign Debt Crisis’, Forbes (online), 15 October 2012 
<http://www.forbes.com/sites/shawnbaldwin/2012/10/15/basel-barriers/>. Douglas Elliott 
calls it a ‘dangerous misconception’ that raising capital requirements will ensure a safer 
banking requirement and believes considerably more debate is needed: Douglas J Elliott, 
‘Higher Bank Capital Requirements Would Come at a Price’ (Research Paper, Brookings 
Institution, 20 February 2013).  
 56 Beck et al, above n 48, 4. 
 57 Ibid 5. 
 58 Senechal (ed), ‘Rethinking Trade & Finance’, above n 1, 13. 
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Most experts expected that Basel III would considerably increase trade 
finance pricing worldwide if implemented in its original form.59 In January 2013, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision bowed to longstanding pressure 
from the banking industry to modify the liquidity coverage ratio (‘LCR’) for 
trade finance products.60 The Basel Committee also delayed full implementation 
of the LCR requirements until 2019.61 
The LCR requires banks to hold enough liquid assets to be able to withstand a 
30 day liquidity crisis.62 The original rule was drafted narrowly and limited what 
banks could count as liquid assets to only include money and government 
bonds.63 The Basel Committee has now extended the rule to include less 
traditional assets, such as residential mortgage-backed securities, to satisfy up to 
15 per cent of the LCR.64 Additionally, banks are now only required to hold 30 
per cent of the funds they would theoretically lose access to in a crisis — a 
significant decrease from the 100 per cent originally required.65 While the initial 
rule assumed that banks would lose 5 per cent of their retail deposits during a 
theoretical 30 day crisis, the modified LCR assumes a loss of 3 per cent.66 
Furthermore, banks will now only have to be partly in compliance by  
1 January 2015, the date at which the original rule was supposed to be 
implemented.67 The modified LCR will now be gradually phased in over the 
further four years leading to 2019.68 
The decision to relax the LCR in January 2013 has generally been regarded by 
the industry as positive.69 However, some banks have criticised part of the 
amendment, which states that the LCR requirement should be based on collateral 
calls caused by market valuation changes, calculated by the highest collateral 
outflow during the preceding 24 months.70 Critics argue that the amendment 
could significantly increase the volatility of bank liquidity requirements, which 
in turn will force banks to hold much higher levels of liquidity to ensure 
compliance.71 This could affect a bank’s capacity to provide trade finance. Even 
                                                 
 59 See, eg, Bainbridge, above n 37. Some believe Basel III could increase trade finance pricing 
by up to 40 per cent: Gilles Thieffry, ‘The Impact of Basel III on Commodity Trade 
Finance: Legal and Regulatory Aspects’ (2011) 26 Journal of International Banking Law 
and Regulation 455, 457. See also Viren Vaghela, ‘Basel III Threatens to Throttle Trade 
Finance’, Asia Risk (online), 9 July 2012 <http://www.risk.net/asi 
a-risk/feature/2190078/basel-iii-threatens-throttle-trade-finance>. 
 60 David Enrich, Geoffrey T Smith and Andrew Morse, ‘Rules for Lenders  
Relaxed — Regulators Agree to Ease Requirements for Meeting Guideline on Liquidity’, 
The Wall Street Journal (New York), 7 January 2013, C1; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, ‘Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Liquidity Risk Monitoring Tools’ 
(Bank for International Settlements, January 2013). 
 61 Enrich, Smith and Morse, above n 60. 
 62 Ibid. 
 63 Ibid. 
 64 Ibid. 
 65 Ibid. 
 66 Ibid. 
 67 Ibid. 
 68 Ibid. 
 69 See ibid. 
 70 Michael Watt, ‘Banks Round on LCR Approach to Derivatives Collateral Flows’, Risk 
Magazine (online), 27 June 2013 <http://www.risk.net/risk-m 
agazine/feature/2277631/banks-round-on-lcr-approach-to-derivatives-collateral-flows>. 
 71 Ibid. 
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if the amendment to the LCR eases pressure on trade finance, the longer-term 
impact of Basel III as a whole is still likely to increase the cost of financing 
trade. 
V POTENTIAL RESPONSES TO THESE CHALLENGES 
Further Adjustments to the Basel III Rules 
Trade finance rates of default and loss have historically been very low, even 
during crises. In 2009, the ICC and ADB initiated a trade finance default register 
to collect performance data on trade finance products.72 The register collects data 
from 21 global banks that provide more than USD2 trillion in short-term  
export-related credit, roughly 65 per cent of the world’s total.73 The data 
collected by the project supports the claim that trade finance is much less risky 
than other parts of banking. Between 2008 and 2011 the ICC Trade Finance 
Register recorded fewer than 1800 defaults in a dataset of 8.1 million short-term 
trade finance transactions.74 During the same period the rates of default for  
off-balance sheet trade products were particularly low, with only 947 defaults 
recorded in a sample of 5.2 million transactions.75 The data collected determined 
the probability of loss as just 0.02 per cent.76 By contrast, the average rate of 
default for corporates rated by Moody’s Investors Service Inc between 2008 and 
2011 was 2.41 per cent.77 This comparison highlights the fact that trade finance 
has a low level of risk. 
Until recently, there was no differentiation between trade finance and other 
forms of finance in credit conversion factors (‘CCFs’) for calculating the 
leverage ratio.78 Under the proposed rules, banks were required to apply a CCF 
of 100 per cent for all off-balance sheet items when calculating a leverage 
ratio.79 An exception that attracted the application of a CCF of 10 per cent was 
where, without prior notice to the beneficiary, the claim was unconditionally 
cancellable.80 
                                                 
 72 Thierry Senechal (ed), ‘Global Risks — Trade Finance 2011’ (Report, International 
Chamber of Commerce Banking Commission, 26 October 2011) 2 (‘Global Risks 2011’). 
 73 Brooke Masters, ‘Push to Cut Trade Finance from Basel III’, Financial Times (online), 16 
April 2013 <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5b8b9f1c-a678-11e2-885b-00144feabdc0.html 
#axzz2XU9DFw8g>. 
 74 Thierry Sénéchal (ed), ‘2013 Global Risks Trade Finance Report’ (Report, International 
Chamber of Commerce Banking Commission, April 2013), 15 (‘Global Risks 2013’). 
 75 Senechal (ed), ‘Global Risks 2011’, above n 72, 16. 
 76 Vaghela, ‘Basel III Threatens to Throttle Trade Finance’, above n 59; Sénéchal (ed), ‘Global 
Risks 2013’, above n 74, 15.  
 77 Sénéchal (ed), ‘Global Risks 2013’, above n 74, 17. 
 78 Garima Chitkara and Aaron Woolner, ‘Revised LCR Falls Short on Ending Basel III 
Concerns over Trade Finance’, Asia Risk (online), 6 February 2013 
<http://www.risk.net/asia-risk/news/2242693/revised-lcr-falls-short-on-ending-basel-iii-
concerns-over-trade-finance>.  
 79 Laurence Neville, ‘Euromoney Trade Finance Survey 2012: Trade Not Getting the Credit’, 
Euromoney (online), January 2012 <http://www.euromoney.com/Article/29594 
89/Euromoney-Trade-Finance-survey-2012-Trade-not-getting-the-credit.html?Type=Articl 
e&ArticleID=2959489>.  
 80 Chitkara and Woolner, above n 78. 
10 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 15 
Trade credit traditionally attracted a low risk weighting of 20 per cent under 
the first iteration of the Basel Accord81 for two reasons: first, because of the 
historically low default rates and second, because trade finance facilities are 
typically secured against the goods or commodities being financed. Under a 
typical trade finance facility, the bank extending the credit has the bills of lading 
or other title documents to the goods or commodities pledged to it and only 
releases this pledge when it is either paid or another security interest is put in 
place.82 Accordingly, if the bank is not paid it should be able to recover much of 
the credit it has extended by selling the goods or commodities. 
The CCF of 20 per cent in the first Basel Accord remained largely unchanged 
under Basel II.83 However, on 10 January 2010 the Basel Committee proposed 
the introduction of a flat 100 per cent CCF to certain off-balance sheet items in 
an attempt to reduce incentives for ‘leveraging’.84 This proposal included letters 
of credit and similar trade finance facilities.85 Given that the objective of the 
leverage ratio is to prevent the build-up of excessive leverage in the banking 
sector, subjecting trade finance to a 100 per cent CCF was utterly excessive; 
because trade finance underpins the movement of goods and commodities, it 
does not lead to the sort of leveraging that may endanger real economic 
activity.86 
Data collected by the ICC and ADB supports the view that the leverage ratio 
in its proposed form did not reflect market realities and may have significantly 
limited banks’ ability to provide affordable financing to businesses in developing 
countries and SMEs in developed countries.87 As indicated by the ICC in its 
report ‘Global Risks — Trade Finance 2011’, the leverage ratio proposed by 
Basel III could have adverse effects on global trade and growth by: 
(a) curtailing banks’ ability to provide affordable financing to businesses in 
developing and low-income countries and to SMEs in developed countries;  
(b) increasing the cost of trade, with banks raising their prices to pay the costs 
associated with the more stringent regulatory requirements; (c) encouraging banks 
to move high-quality trade assets and contingents into non-bank sectors and 
higher-risk, unregulated markets such as hedge funds, thereby defeating the 
purpose of strengthening the resilience of the banking sector; and (d) re-defining 
the banking map because inconsistencies in the implementation of the regulatory 
regime at the national level can create competitive arbitrage opportunities in some 
financial markets and can have an impact on the domiciling of banks.88 
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When implementing the Basel III guidelines, the European Union recognised 
that the proposed 100 per cent CCF was disproportionate to the level of risk 
posed by trade finance.89 Realising the importance of trade finance for growth, 
the EU decided to introduce regulations to reduce the capital required to be held 
for trade finance products.90 The Basel Committee has since followed suit, 
amending its guidelines for trade assets in January 2014.91 Short-term trade 
letters of credit will now once again attract a 20 per cent CCF, which will be 
applied to both issuing and confirming banks.92 
As with its relaxation of the LCR requirement, this latest decision by the 
Basel Committee is a positive step that will no doubt assist with the availability 
of trade finance over time. Nevertheless, there are still further important changes 
that should be made. 
At present, Basel III uses a standard asset value correlation (‘AVC’) for 
corporate banking, imposing a treatment for trade finance that does not reflect its 
short-term, low risk nature.93 The current rule requires the AVC to be multiplied 
by 1.25 in respect of exposures to financial institutions whose assets exceed 
USD100 billion and to all unregulated financial institutions, regardless of size.94 
The increase in AVC applies to all sources of credit risk exposure.95 The rule is 
based on the assumption that such exposures present greater default correlations 
than others.96 This assumption ignores the indisputable fact that trade finance 
rates of default are substantially lower than rates of default in other banking 
sectors. 
While Basel III subjects corporate banking to a blanket AVC, consumer 
banking is granted several product-specific default curves.97 Under Basel III, 
separate AVCs are applied to retail mortgages, credit cards and other retail 
exposures.98 Like retail banking, corporate banking products should be 
distinguished from one another to accurately reflect their level of risk. Applying 
a standard AVC is likely to increase the cost of providing trade finance, and may 
prompt smaller banks to pursue other, more profitable areas of banking.99 In the 
words of the international banking industry association BAFT-IFSA: 
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The AVC proposals recommended by the Basel Committee could increase the 
cost of providing credit for trade transactions and limit their availability, 
particularly in emerging markets that rely on sustained and affordable access to 
trade finance to support commercial activities.100 
Recent changes to the LCR and leverage ratio under Basel III came about 
after sustained pressure from the trade finance industry.101 At present, making 
further changes to the rules will be difficult for the Basel Committee given the 
public sentiment towards banks.102 While trade finance is crucial for world trade, 
it is currently seen as a minor issue in comparison to the ongoing Eurozone crisis 
and other problems in the banking sector.103 Furthermore, the Basel Committee 
is faced with the challenge that if they make concessions for one type of 
financing, others might make such claims as well.104 This would greatly strain 
the whole regulatory system and potentially undermine its objectives.105 
Given that statistical information demonstrates that trade finance is less risky 
than other forms of finance, there is a strong case for the industry to continue 
lobbying the Basel Committee to modify the Basel III rules. Without changes to 
the AVC, it is highly likely that the price of trade finance will increase, with 
damaging consequences for global trade and thus global growth. 
A Crisis Contains within It an Opportunity — For China 
The idea that the Chinese character for ‘crisis’ contains within it the character 
for ‘opportunity’ is such an elegant idea that it is often used by authors.106 Sadly 
it is not the case107 — but it is such a nice, elegant idea that it should be. 
Matters of calligraphy aside, this crisis of inadequate trade finance in the East 
Asia region would seem to present an opportunity for Chinese banks which we 
are somewhat surprised they have not seized. At the Loan Market Association’s 
syndicated loan conference in London in 2012, there was a general consensus 
among panel members that Chinese banks were preparing themselves to fill the 
void left by the French banks in the commodity finance market.108 According to 
Simon Tyler, head of corporate banking for China Construction Bank 
Corporation in London: 
Banks such as Industrial and Commercial Bank of China …, Agricultural Bank of 
China, and China’s Bank of Communications are already in talks about their 
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moves over to London and are very keen on developing relationships with the top 
players. Although it will be a while before this presence is fully realised, partly 
because they are being very cautious. But slowly and surely as this happens we’ll 
see them competing with each other as much as with international banks.109 
One reason for Chinese banks to be cautious is the rapid growth of credit in 
China, which has been increasing at a rate of 22 per cent a year.110 In 2012, 
credit in China grew more than twice as fast as its gross domestic product.111 The 
Chinese government is now taking measures to tighten liquidity levels and limit 
risky lending, in what some analysts say could be Beijing’s most drastic 
clampdown on credit in two decades.112 In late June 2013, China’s central bank 
temporarily stopped lending money in an attempt to reduce the reliance of banks 
on credit.113 China’s other banks are now following the government’s orders by 
reducing lending, impacting the availability of finance for certain commodities 
such as gold, rubber and base metals.114 For example, in May 2013 two banks 
stopped issuing letters of credit with long maturity dates to jewellers importing 
gold into the mainland for export processing.115 
In addition to the Chinese government’s crackdown on lending, other 
challenges exist that may delay China’s entry into the trade finance space. One 
example is the difficulty faced in opening branches in London and wider Europe 
due to licensing requirements.116 It may also take time for China to establish the 
requisite ‘back office’ needed to compete consistently in the trade finance 
industry.117 Trade finance document checking is very technical and requires very 
substantial and detailed training of staff, which takes some considerable time.118 
While China has not yet stepped into the regional trade finance gap left by the 
Europeans, it seems likely to do so in the next few years. At the end of 2013, the 
CNY surpassed the EUR and JPY to become the second most used currency in 
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trade finance after the USD.119 However, while use of the CNY by importers and 
exporters for financing agreements almost doubled during 2013, the currency 
was mostly used within China.120 Globally, the CNY was only used to pay for 
0.8 per cent of the world’s transactions.121 
Though rigorous training will be required, China has proven itself very adroit 
at acquiring expertise in a wide range of technical and scientific fields and the 
trade finance industry should be no exception. In addition, providing trade 
finance would seem to be a clever move for a government wanting to cut back on 
risky lending, given the exceptionally low rate of default on trade credits.122 In 
2012, 73 per cent of all export transactions took place in the Asia-Pacific, and the 
region received the most letters of credit.123 There is an opportunity for China to 
make a considerable impact should it choose to step into the regional trade 
finance industry. 
Deepening Cross-Border Cooperation 
Deepening regional cooperation on trade finance would be beneficial to all 
parties.124 By pooling resources and expertise, the Asian region would be better 
equipped to tackle bottlenecks in trade financing.125 The cost of providing trade 
finance would also likely decrease.126 Cooperation within the region would 
reduce reliance on foreign finance, which tends to be heavily procyclical and 
often destabilising.127 This is particularly significant given the current trade 
finance gap caused by the retreat of European banks from Asia. 
In the past, several developing countries with well-developed trade finance 
institutions have tackled bottlenecks in South–South trade finance by opening 
branches of their institutions in other countries within the region.128 An example 
is the Thai EXIM Bank, which opened a branch in Moscow in 2009 to facilitate 
the financing of exports from Thailand to Russia.129 
In March 2012 the export–import banks of Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa (‘BRICS’) signed two agreements to extend credit facilities to each 
other in local currencies.130 It is expected that the move will reduce the demand 
for fully convertible currencies for transactions among the BRICS, which should 
help to reduce transaction costs.131 The initiative will also assist to shield the 
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BRICS from the Eurozone crisis and boost trade despite the slow growth of 
developed country markets.132 
Strengthening the regional network of export-import banks and development 
finance institutions within Asia would assist the region to achieve the aims of the 
BRICS agreements. As the Eurozone crisis continues, European banks may well 
continue to withdraw credit from the Asian region. Deepening cross-border 
cooperation within Asia will reduce the cost of trade finance within the region, 
tackle current trade finance bottlenecks and help to insulate Asian economies 
from the crisis in Europe. 
Despite the benefits that could be derived from regional cooperation, previous 
initiatives to improve financial cooperation within Asia have not always received 
support. In 2010, an East Asia Summit (‘EAS’) Trade Finance Workshop was 
held in Sydney and brought together trade finance officials from 13 nations to 
exchange views on trade finance proposals that could advance regional trade.133 
Though financial cooperation was given special attention at the workshop, 
Australia’s idea of establishing an EAS Trade Finance Network was not 
supported by other members.134 Nonetheless, the creation of a trade finance 
network within Asia is something that regional countries should continue to 
pursue. Its potential benefits to the region, given the ongoing demand for trade 
credit in the region, mean it would be very worthwhile. 
Creating a Ring-Fenced Liquidity Pool for Trade Finance 
Since the global financial crisis, banks have become more risk averse and 
prefer to work with large, sound multinational firms.135 Consequently, SMEs and 
new exporters have been especially vulnerable to the tightening trade finance 
conditions.136 SMEs typically have a weaker capital base and bargaining power 
in relation to global buyers and banks, and have been subjected to large increases 
in trade finance costs.137 This is especially true of emerging firms that often face 
higher interest rates, higher fees on letters of credit and higher capital 
requirements than established firms.138 In addition, firms in developing countries 
with underdeveloped financial systems and weak contractual enforcement 
systems are particularly affected by a lack of affordable trade finance as they 
need it the most.139 The lack of available trade finance for SMEs in developing 
countries impacts economic growth and job creation in those countries.140 
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Assisting SMEs to access trade finance is especially crucial in Asia, as SMEs 
account for 80–90 per cent of Asian businesses.141 
Establishing a small, targeted liquidity pool run by international financial 
institutions would be useful to assist smaller segments of the market that are 
more vulnerable to the contraction of trade credit supply.142 After the global 
financial crisis, much of the increased liquidity support provided by central 
banks was used to ease money market conditions and improve liquidity ratios.143 
As a result, trade transactions did not benefit greatly from the liquidity support, 
despite having remained a safe haven during the banking crisis.144 Creating a 
ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance would ensure that adequate funds 
remain available to assist trade by SMEs and new exporters, even during times of 
crisis when banks may prefer to direct funds elsewhere. 
For banks, the downside to ring-fencing is that liquidity is prevented from 
being used for other purposes at times when those other purposes might be more 
pressing.145 Holding liquidity centrally and directing it to locations where it is 
most needed is a more efficient and cost effective process from which large  
cross-border banking groups can benefit.146 Nonetheless, any disadvantages of a 
ring-fenced liquidity pool for trade finance could well be outweighed by the 
benefit of ensuring that trade finance is still available for SMEs and new 
exporters when economic crises occur and trade finance conditions tighten. 
Encouraging Co-Finance between the Various Providers of Trade Finance, 
including Public Sector-Backed Institutions 
The majority of trade finance is provided by the private sector. In 2009, 
private banks accounted for about 80 per cent of all trade finance lending 
operations.147 Such reliance on banks leaves trading firms vulnerable in times of 
crisis, as seen with the recent drop in trade credit within Asia. To reduce the 
impact of crises on trade finance flows, public sector actors, such as ECAs and 
RDBs, should share jointly some of the private sector risk.148 In the words of 
Pascal Lamy: 
One clear lesson from the Asian financial crisis is that in periods prone to a lack 
of trust and transparency, and herd behaviour, all actors — including private 
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banks …, export credit agencies and regional development banks — should pool 
their resources, as far as practicable.149 
An example of a successful private/public partnership was the introduction in 
2009 of the Global Trade Liquidity Program by the IFC which allowed an 
agreement between the IFC and commercial banks for 40–60 per cent  
co-lending.150 The program allowed banks to continue to support clients with 
trade finance.151 It also enabled the IFC to revitalise trade flows by using the 
banks’ vast networks to channel liquidity and credit into emerging markets 
globally.152 Within the Asian region, the ADB’s Trade Finance Program (‘TFP’) 
provides guarantees and loans to commercial banks to support trade, particularly 
in developing countries. In 2012, the TFP supported USD4 billion in trade, 
benefiting 1577 SMEs.153 When surveyed by the ADB, local banks indicated that 
without the TFP, their trade finance support to companies would have declined 
by at least 13 per cent.154 
Mobilising both private and public sector institutions to form a partnership 
during times of crisis would help to ensure that the needs of those with 
insufficient funds could be met by institutions with excess capacities.155 
However, co-financing between the two sectors need not only occur in times of 
crisis. In poor countries, closing structural market gaps requires longer-term 
public involvement.156 Furthermore, ongoing risk sharing between the public and 
private sectors should reduce the impact of any future financial crisis on the 
availability of trade finance. 
Establishing a Regional Trade Finance Database to Facilitate the Collection 
and Exchange of Information 
Filling information gaps between public and private institutions is of great 
importance, particularly during times of economic crisis. While responding to the 
financial crisis that commenced in 2008, members of the Bankers’ Association 
for Trade and Finance complained that a series of measures announced by ECAs 
and RDBs were hard to track.157 They also lacked access to critical information, 
such as who was providing what finance and based on what criteria.158 Such 
information gaps affect the ability of both the public and private sectors to 
respond to trade finance challenges, particularly in developing countries.159 It is 
thus crucial that information is collected and shared among trade finance 
stakeholders within the region. 
The ICC Trade Register established by the ICC and ADB in 2009 was a 
significant step towards increasing the sharing of trade finance information. As 
                                                 
 149 Lamy, ‘Restate Trade Finance’, above n 147. 
 150 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 17. 
 151 International Finance Corporation, above n 20. 
 152 Ibid. 
 153 Beck et al, above n 48, 2. 
 154 Ibid. 
 155 Auboin and Engemann, ‘Trade Finance in Periods of Crisis’, above n 5, 13. 
 156 Ibid 3. 
 157 Lamy, ‘Restate Trade Finance’, above n 147. 
 158 Ibid. 
 159 Ibid. 
18 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 15 
of November 2012, the database had recorded over 15 million transactions 
worldwide, reflecting 70 per cent of global transactions.160 At the time of 
writing, it is the most comprehensive database available on trade and export 
finance.161 Nevertheless, the register only records data provided from 
participating banks162 and gaps in the data remain. For example, in 2011 the 21 
banks participating in the ICC Trade Register provided only a quarter to a third 
of global trade finance.163 Within the Asian region, much more information is 
needed as to how SMEs in particular finance their trade and the challenges they 
face. 
While the ICC Trade Register provides useful information regarding trade 
finance transactions, it is not released immediately. The ICC released the latest 
trade finance report in April 2013,164 nearly two years after its prior report.165 
This information is crucial for the development of policy regarding trade finance, 
but it does not provide stakeholders with up-to-date information about the type 
and amount of trade finance being provided at the present time. In times of crisis, 
such information is needed to allow trade finance institutions to respond rapidly. 
In order to address gaps in trade finance information, a regional database 
should be created that disseminates relevant information to both public and 
private institutions, such as the development of programs by ECAs. Such a 
database should include all trade finance stakeholders within the Asian region, 
not just commercial banks. It is important that the information gap between the 
public and private sectors is filled so that both sectors can respond quickly when 
shortfalls in trade finance arise. 
VI CONCLUSION 
Trade is essential to the health and growth of economies worldwide. The 
availability of trade finance is crucial as most trade transactions are supported by 
some form of credit financing.166 There is also a strong link between trade 
finance, economic growth and job creation, which is particularly important in the 
Asian region. In a survey conducted by the ADB in the fourth quarter of 2012, 
138 companies said that a 5 per cent increase in trade finance support would 
result in a 2 per cent increase in their business and a 2 per cent increase in their 
staffing needs.167 The same companies said that a 10 per cent increase in trade 
finance support would result in 5 per cent increase in production and jobs.168 
These statistics show how crucial trade finance is to East Asia. 
The financial crisis of 2007–08 sparked a global shortfall in trade finance and, 
while the G20 and financial agencies worldwide responded in a significant way, 
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a substantial trade finance gap remains. A recent survey by the ADB shows that 
in 2011, banks responding to the ADB survey received trade finance requests 
amounting to nearly USD4.6 trillion and had to reject USD1.6 trillion of these 
requests.169 This figure indicates that a significant proportion of global trade is 
unable to be financed. Given global trade totalled USD18 trillion in 2011,170 it is 
likely that the actual trade finance gap is very substantial indeed. 
The shortfall has particularly affected the Asia-Pacific region, as a higher 
proportion of trade is financed there than in any other region. The ADB survey 
suggests a trade finance gap of at least USD424.72 billion in developing Asia,171 
which has arisen in part due to the rapid reduction in finance provided by 
European banks struggling with the ongoing economic crisis at home. While 
international and Japanese banks have stepped in, the amount of trade finance 
provided in Asia is still insufficient and the cost has increased considerably. 
The impending full implementation of Basel III poses a further challenge to 
trade finance in the Asian region. While the relaxation of the LCR requirements 
in January 2013 and changes to the leverage ratio in January 2014 eased the 
pressure on trade finance, these amendments did not eradicate it. Further 
adjustments are required to ensure that the longer-term impact of Basel III does 
not increase the cost of financing trade. In particular, changes to the AVC are 
necessary to prevent rising trade finance prices impacting on global growth. With 
respect, the proposal to increase the risk weighting on trade finance to 100 per 
cent must have been the work of people without experience in these markets. No 
one who understands the finance of international trade could perceive it as a 
risky industry or as a source of unwanted leverage in the system. The Basel 
Committee’s most welcome recent decision to reduce the CCF used in 
calculating the leverage ratio back to 20 per cent supports this view. 
A number of strategies could be implemented to address a lack of affordable 
trade finance in the Asian region. These include strengthening cross-border 
cooperation, encouraging co-financing between the public and private sectors, 
establishing a regional trade finance database to share information and creating 
ring-fenced liquidity pools for trade finance. In times of crisis, it is essential that 
all stakeholders work together and share information and resources to address 
trade finance needs efficiently and effectively. 
It is a little curious that China has not yet seized the opportunity presented by 
Europe’s rapid retreat from trade finance in Asia to step into the gap. Given the 
low risk nature of trade finance, it would seem an attractive way for Chinese 
domestic banks to expand into conducting international business. Nevertheless, 
the substantial size of the current trade finance gap suggests there is still space 
for China to make a move. Trade finance offers China a very low risk field into 
which its banks could expand. Such a move would help to address the ongoing 
trade finance gap and support the further development of economies in the Asian 
region. 
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